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This dissertation is about ethical failures on the offspring of the financial crisis of 2007-
2009 and puts its main emphasis on an issue identified as one of the causes of that crisis, 
namely predatory lending. The objective of this work is to determine the influences of 
predatory lending as a cause to that financial crisis and to identify the kind of practices 
it involved to be aware on their repetition, so as to avoid another financial crisis caused 
by repetition of the same mistakes. 
I use as methodology a meta-analysis of documents published since 2004 on the subject 
of predatory lending, using Scopus database as reference. I try to get an overview of the 
scientific production on this topic and verify if predatory lending was a relevant cause 
to the financial crisis of 2007-2009. I get to the conclusion that, despite not being the 
most relevant factor, it played an important role in feeding a many cogs’ greater 
machine that ultimately caused the crisis. 
With this dissertation, I hope to give a modest contribution about what caused the latest 
great financial crisis. This way we can be more observant in comparing present reality 














Esta dissertação é sobre falhas éticas na origem da crise financeira de 2007-2009 e 
coloca a principal ênfase num tema identificado como uma das causas dessa crise, 
nomeadamente os empréstimos predatórios. O objetivo deste trabalho é determinar a 
influência dos empréstimos predatórios como causa para essa crise financeira e 
identificar o tipo de práticas que incluíram, para que estejamos alerta à sua repetição, 
de modo a evitar outra crise financeira pela repetição dos mesmos erros. 
Uso como metodologia uma meta-análise de documentos publicados desde 2004 sobre 
o assunto dos empréstimos predatórios, usando a base de dados Scopus como 
referência. Tento obter uma visão geral da produção científica neste tópico e verificar 
se os empréstimos predatórios foram uma causa relevante para a crise financeira de 
2007-2009. Concluo que, apesar de não ter sido o fator mais relevante, desempenhou 
um importante papel ao alimentar uma máquina maior com muitas rodas que foi a 
grande causadora da crise. 
Com esta dissertação, espero dar um modesto contributo sobre os motivos da última 
grande crise financeira. Desta forma poderemos estar mais atentos na comparação da 
realidade atual com aquela que precedeu a crise financeira de 2007-2009 para evitar 
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Included in the Master’s in Finance at ISEG – Lisbon School of Economics and 
Management of Universidade de Lisboa, I decided to present as Master’s Final Work a 
dissertation on the topic “Ethical failures on the offspring of the global financial crisis of 
2007–2009”. 
At the beginning of this century, occurred a financial crisis that was the biggest economic 
crisis most living persons have ever experienced. The financial crisis of 2007-2009 
started in the USA but spread worldwide. It had tremendously negative effects in 
worldwide populations that, in the end, were the most penalized by the costs of the 
crisis. 
It is important to be attentive to the acts of those who can influence the markets 
including financial institutions. The Finance discipline is the best branch of the Economic 
sciences to study the causes and consequences of the financial crisis of 2007-2009. 
Economics and Finance are the disciplines who can play the best role in the prevention 
of a new crisis. 
Under the supervision of Professor Rafael Jorge Soares Duarte Marques, teacher at ISEG, 
I make a theoretical review of relevant literature concerning possible explanations to 
what led to the collapse of financial markets, with my focus on the United States of 
America (U.S.A.) that was the epicentre of the crisis and the nation most affected by it. 
I consider it is important to make a Dissertation on the topic of ethics because this 
subject has gained relevance in recent years including with the CFA Institute. By lack of 
space in a work like this, I focus on a theme that can be considered one of the main 
causes of the financial crisis of 2007-2009 that was predatory lending, and how 




the subprime crisis is one of the key questions in the academic and policy debate about 
the sources of the crisis and its aftermath” (Agarwal, 2014, p. 20). 
This Master’s Final Work is a meta-analysis of documents published since 2004, selected 
from searching the keyword “predatory lending” in Scopus database, having found 170 
articles. This search was made on the 1st of October 2018. I analyse 23 documents, 
including articles, reviews, an editorial and a note, with a critical perspective, 
differentiating the methodologies used by each author and their main results. 
My objectives are to understand the way an ethical problem such as predatory lending 
might have contributed to the 2007-2009 financial crisis, share knowledge in an easy 
manner, and add value in the field of ethics. 
I leave the discussion open to those that have more time and space, to deepen the 
investigation on other possible causes to the crisis. These possible causes include: 
failures on corporate governance and risk management, trading of credit default swaps 
and collateralized debt obligations backed by subprime mortgages and of other 
derivative contracts, trading of complex financial instruments where the traders 
sometimes did not completely know the products they were selling, loose monetary 
policy and the housing bubble, failure of regulatory agencies and deregulation, 
misbehaviour by credit rating agencies, short-termism of executives, and hedge funds. 
Nowadays, ethics is gaining field in the teaching of Finance as a growingly important part 
of creating the next generation of managers and directors, what can be beneficial to 
society as a whole. A commitment to high ethical standards is more than ever needed 
to maintain the public’s trust in financial markets and in finance professionals. 
After this introduction, I start by describing the methodology used in this work followed 
by a presentation of the theme “predatory lending”. Then I expose the results of the 
studies I analyse, sub-dividing those results in various topics such as racial discrimination 




and follow with the conclusion and a chapter about the limitations of this work and 
perspectives of future research. Then I present the bibliography cited in the work and 
end up with two annexes, one with a table of the articles discussed in this review of the 
literature, and another with a brief description of the statistical models and variables 
used by the authors that included a quantitative methodology on their studies, to 
complement the information presented on the section “Results”. 
 
2. Methodology 
Though there is a vast literature both with quantitative and qualitative analysis on the 
financial crisis of 2007-2009 and on ethical failures in its offspring, it is not on the scope 
of this Master’s Dissertation to analyse it all. I focus on predatory lending as one of the 
ethical failures on the origin of that crisis. About this topic, there´s a vast and relevant 
literature published in the last decade and a half. So, my study concentrates on 
documents published about predatory lending since 2004, that I consider worth 
reviewing in a Master’s in Finance dissertation scope. My main objective is trying to 
elucidate how influent was predatory lending on the origin of the aforementioned crisis. 
I have started by searching the expression “predatory lending” on the Scopus database 
on the 1st of October 2018. That search gave me 170 documents, that I then refined until 
I had 23 documents to analyse. I started by reading the abstracts of the 170 documents 
and excluded 70 that were not relevant for the scope of my work. From the 100 
documents I was left with, I excluded two that were not in the areas of “Social Sciences”, 
“Economics, Econometrics and Finance”, “Business, Management and Accounting”; and 
also excluded one book. Then I excluded documents which sources were not Journals or 
Reviews related to business, economics and finance and I was left with 70 documents. I 




Predatory Lending; Subprime and Predatory Lending; Mortgage Frauds; Lending 
Behaviour; Lending Practices; Predatory Lending and Borrowing; Financial Ethics. I was 
left with 33 documents. 
From those, I was able to download 24 documents from Scopus and excluded one of 
them because it was an introductory article with only 3 pages. In the end, I was left with 
23 documents that I list in Annex I. There, I include a table with the following information 
about the articles sorted by date from the most recent: authors; publishing year; source; 
title; countries studied; countries of the authors; number of citations in Scopus; the most 
relevant keyword for choosing that article; methodology; authors’ affiliations (academic 
or non-academic); and results. This way, it became much easier and accelerated the 
interpretation of the data. 
Then I thoroughly reviewed each of the articles and elaborated the chapter “Results”. 
After synthesizing the information about the selected articles on the subchapter 
“Analysis and Discussion of Results”, I have drawn the main Conclusions that I expose 
on Chapter 5 of this work. 
 
3. Presentation of the theme 
“Predatory Lending” 
Predatory lending can be defined as the imposition of “unfair and abusive loan terms on 
borrowers, often through aggressive sales tactics, or loans that contain terms and 
conditions that ultimately harm borrowers” (Agarwal et al., 2014, p. 1), a definition that 
is common to the one given by the US Government Accountability Office (2004) and by 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC, 2006). Bond et al. (2009) define 




same information as lenders, and are usually unaffordable, being the objective of the 
lender to seize property. 
Subprime mortgages were not a new product at the beginning of this century, nor were 
new complaints about subprime loans. “Since 1993, the HUD has been compiling a list 
of lenders who specialize in subprime mortgage lending. About 700,000 mortgages were 
originated annually between 1998 and 2000 by lenders whose primary business was 
originating subprime loans” (Mayer et al., 2008, p. 2). But at the beginning of the 
century, things would acquire a greater proportion. 
One of the examples of the practice of predatory lending was the encouragement of 
home loans to people who could not afford them. Unsuitable loans were made without 
adequate determination and documentation of creditworthiness. Lenders in return 
charged a higher interest rate. That was a way to get people quickly into mortgages. 
From 2000 to 2007, low- and no-doc loans rapidly and unexpectedly increased “from 
less than 2% to roughly 9% of all outstanding loans” (The Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission [FCIC], 2011, p. 110). Eventually, the lender knew that loans could not be 
repaid and would likely ruin the borrower and cause massive losses to investors in 
mortgage securities. Creditworthiness was judged not on the basis of a borrower’s 
ability to repay but on the value of the collateral. This was predatory because the lender 
was making a loan with the intent of seizing property when the borrower defaulted. 
Such loans were merely devious ways of acquiring property, what seemed good for the 
lenders as long as loan-to-value (LTV) ratios protected their investment. But lenders 
were just betting that home prices would go up forever. 
Moreover, important terms of loans were concealed or disguised or otherwise not made 
known, especially to unsuspecting and unsophisticated borrowers who could not 




profits. Some of these consumers were not even able to make their initial payments 
because the terms were far worse than what the brokers had initially sold them. 
Another shift that had serious consequences was the regularity of loans with LTV ratios 
above 80%, what once was rare. There was a special attraction for lending huge sums of 
money to poor immigrants. We also had the case of the so-called NINJA loans where 
borrowers had no income, no job and no assets. There was no credit check before the 
loan approval, and these people had no capacity to make a down payment so the lender 
just loaned 100% of the house purchase price. The industry itself started calling “liar 
loans” to these kinds of predatory mortgages. 
Another predatory practice was to induce borrowers to refinance unnecessarily into 
new loans repeatedly. This way the lenders collected additional fees in a process known 
as “flipping”. But who were these borrowers? Who were these unscrupulous people? 
Some of them were recent graduates, others had been flipping burgers, but this was a 
field that even employed ex-convicts. This was a fertile land for fraud to flourish. 
As was expected, appraisers felt pressed to inflate the value of homes. The pressure 
could come from many sides including mortgage brokers. And the activity of appraisers 
was barely supervised. 
A great pool of money attracted envious eyes. New lenders entered the field. Investors 
wanted more mortgage-related securities and borrowers wanted mortgages. The 
volume of subprime and non-traditional lending rose sharply. All this predatory lending 
resulted on the nearly doubling of mortgage defaults “from the summer of 2006 to late 
2007” (FCIC, 2011, p. xxii). The number of suspicious activity reports related to mortgage 
fraud more than doubled between 2005 and 2009. It had already grown 20-fold between 




Since the late 1990’s, consumer advocates started raising the issues of predatory lending 
and of homeowners that could not afford to pay their mortgages, with the Federal 
Reserve and other banking regulators. A government report was made on the sequence 
of these complaints, but the report did not fall in the gusto of the Congress, no measures 
were taken and the problems persisted. The status quo changed little. Even the 
traditional banks started to feel competitive pressure from the non-traditional lenders 
and also increased their overwriting of poor-quality loans. The regulatory agencies 
refrained from using the legal system to rein in predatory lenders, they failed what was 
expected of them and didn’t stop the meltdown of the financial system. 
 
4. Results 
Many Reviews and Journals published articles on the topic of predatory lending, but 
from the 23 documents I have selected, 13 were published by Housing Policy Debate, 
what corresponds to 57% of the sample of articles. From my selection, the years with 
more documents published were 2004 with 6 articles (26% of the articles), 2007 with 4 
(17%), and 2013 with 3 articles (13%). The number of relevant documents written some 
years before the collapse of financial markets shows that predatory lending was not a 
new problem and that it had been investigated by researchers for several years. The 
greatest share of these articles was published in the USA with 21 articles. About the 
country studied, the USA is the country most studied, with all the 23 articles making 
reference to the practices of predatory lending in that country. It is understandable 
because the USA was the epicentre of the crisis. Of the articles selected, “predatory 
lending” was the most important keyword influencing my choice of 13 articles, mainly 
from 2007 forwards. Keyword “subprime and predatory lending” was the most influent 




I verify that 11 articles were written by only one author, 6 documents were written by 
two authors, and 6 articles were published by three or more authors, so more than half 
were written in co-authorship. Of my selection, Kurt Eggert and Wei Li are the authors 
that contributed with two documents. The others contributed with only one. 
12 documents were written by academics, 6 articles were written by non-academics, 
and the remaining 5 were published by a mix of academics and non-academics which 
can mean that there was a cooperative relationship between researchers from different 
backgrounds. About methodology, most of the articles involve a quantitative study, 
namely 15 articles, while the remaining 8 documents only include a qualitative analysis. 
All the articles written by a mix of academics and non-academics involve a quantitative 
methodology. From the articles that only involved a qualitative methodology, they were 
predominantly written by academics, namely 6 documents, while the other 2 were 
published by non-academics. 
The most cited articles are, according to Scopus: “The sociology and geography of 
mortgage markets: Reflections on the financial crisis” (2009) with 84 citations written 
by Manuel Aalbers that brings his perspective as a sociologist to the then peaking crisis; 
“Measuring the effect of subprime lending on neighbourhood foreclosures: Evidence 
from Chicago” (2005) with 75 citations that is an important article among many that 
analyse racial discrimination in lending practices; “Neighbourhood patterns of subprime 
lending: Evidence from disparate cities” (2004) with 64 citations. On the present decade, 
the most cited documents are: “Racial Dynamics of Subprime Mortgage Lending at the 
Peak” (2013) with 28 citations, once again analysing racial discrimination; “Predatory 
lending and the subprime crisis” (2014) with 20 citations. This last one is the most recent 





4.1 Legislation effects on halting predatory lending 
Agarwal et al. (2014) analyse a pilot program that was executed in an area of the city of 
Chicago on the end of 2006 and beginning of 2007. Despite being planned to last for 4 
years and then extended to other areas, this program stopped due to the pressures of 
not only real estate investors and mortgage originators, but also of community activists 
that feared the prices of the houses would fall due to that legislation. That program 
involved legislative measures to fight predatory lending practices. The authors analyse 
data from various sources and contrast the data gathered from the target population 
with the data gathered from a control sample that was composed by neighbour areas 
inside the city of Chicago. 
The researchers find that about “half of the state-licensed lenders exited the pilot zip 
codes, more than double the exit rate in the control areas. The remaining lenders made 
fewer risky loans and originated credit to borrowers with higher credit quality” (Agarwal 
et al., 2014, p. 2). This research finds that predatory lending practices were reduced 
because of the influence of legislation, by driving predatory lenders out of the market, 
but no effect was seen on mortgage default rates for those lenders who stayed in the 
market. They conclude that the exiting of state-licensed lenders was the factor that 
improved loan performance. 
Garrisson and Li (2011) try to determine if refinancing brought a “net tangible benefit” 
to borrowers or not. It is very difficult for a borrower to decide whether to enter into a 
refinancing or not, due to the complexity of variables she must take into account. 
Garrison and Li use NMDR – National Mortgage Data Repository – information that 
contains relevant documentation not usually accessible to researchers, such as the 
application forms to loans, the closing statements, payments on previous loans and 
transaction fees. They try to show that the methods that were being used by public 




propose as an alternative an analysis of the net present value of refinancing to the 
borrowers and discuss how that can contribute to policy measures. They complete their 
study by analysing government intervention on the refinancing issue. 
Garrison and Li (2011) concluded that loan contracts had many pitfalls. Also, “over the 
past decade, many states have passed legislation designed to protect borrowers from 
loan flipping and equity stripping” (Garrison & Li, 2011, p. 5) and the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB) was created. Since it is difficult to define what is “net tangible 
benefit”, the authors propose that an extensive benefit-cost analysis is used, so CFPB 
can get value from their results and try to apply their methodology, since this was the 
first paper to use NMDR data and it identifies red flags that government authorities 
should take into consideration when passing new anti-predatory laws. Garrison and Li 
finish by suggesting that net present valuation can be useful and even central to the 
proposal of new regulations. 
Goodman and Smith (2010) use state variations in foreclosures, “static and dynamic 
demographic information to control for economic variations and location fixed effects 
[…] to determine the political and locational drivers of default” (Goodman & Smith, 
2010, p. 2). The authors use the hypothesis that if the lenders face fewer costs 
associated with foreclosures they will have more liberal standards in providing loans; 
that if the costs to borrowers from defaulting are lower than those costs are higher to 
the lenders;  
the increased incentive on lenders to tighten underwriting standards influences the rate 
of foreclosures across the market. […] we incorporate legislative controls for both 
predatory lending and foreclosure execution in order to gauge the impact they have on 
the extent of default 




Many states had been adopting anti-predatory legislation since the late 1990s. 
Goodman and Smith (2010) get to the conclusion that lenders and borrowers could both 
benefit from government initiatives to reduce the number of mortgage foreclosures. If 
the burdens imposed on lenders for foreclosures increase, then they will improve their 
mortgage writing standards and this self-restraint would rationalize the mortgage credit 
market. This study suggests that state legislation can have a beneficial effect on the 
number of foreclosures and that state-level intervention should contribute to the 
discussion of measures to be adopted at the general government level. Higher 
foreclosure costs to lenders are associated with an inferior number of foreclosures. 
Bond et al. (2009) also scrutinize possible consequences of regulatory intervention. They 
use a model to evaluate the effects of then recently proposed legislation to protect 
borrowers from predatory lending. To the authors, politicians face the challenge to pass 
legislation that cuts lending practices that reduce welfare but without hurting those 
credit allocation practices that increase welfare. If predatory practices were eliminated, 
then lenders would only be left with the option to refinance prime borrowers. This way 
subprime borrowers would be less vulnerable to dishonest practices by lenders but 
lending volumes to them would also shrink. Some legislation passed proposed to restrict 
prepayment penalties and balloon payments for example. Prepayment penalties would 
have to be paid if a borrower wanted to refinance with a new lender. This way, this kind 
of legislation favours competition and reduces the effects of predatory lending. Balloon 
payments are large percentage payments left to a future amortization of the loan. Since 
many borrowers don’t have the money to make that payment, they will require to 
refinance and, in this case, the lender can use his monopolistic position to pressure the 
borrower to accept predatory conditions. Legislation against these two practices doesn’t 
have its effect at the beginning of the loan but later when it withdraws power from the 




Li and Ernst test the consequences 
of 33 state predatory lending regulatory regimes on the flow and cost of subprime 
residential mortgage credit […] to determine whether state laws are having their 
intended effect of decreasing the prevalence of loan terms targeted for reform without 
diminishing the overall number of loans or giving rise to undesirable increases in costs 
In Li & Ernst (2007), p. 2. 
The researchers set two models. With the first, they try to determine if the newly 
introduced legislation had the desired effects on reducing the targeted terms and test 
the effect on the volume of loans with fair conditions. The second model examines the 
effects on the costs to borrowers of the passing of those legislations. Li and Ernst (2007) 
find that the number of loans with targeted terms decreased while the number of 
subprime loans with fair conditions increased. Also, the authors find that costs to 
consumers decreased. Their study suggests that financial institutions did not face 
substantial costs in complying with new legislation. “These results strongly support the 
conclusion that policy makers have succeeded” (Li & Ernst, 2007, p. 44). 
Engel & McCoy (2004) explain how investors in mortgage-backed securities (MBS) can 
protect themselves from the risks of predatory loans’ backed securities by legal 
protections. The authors propose that legislation must be passed to make investors 
liable so that they audit predatory lenders and get away from investing on MBS that 
include predatory loans. Secondary markets’ participants have the technology and are 
better positioned than borrowers to make the necessary due diligence and police the 
practices of predatory lenders. The authors advocate the need for a balance between 
the necessity to audit predatory lenders practices with the need to keep mortgage credit 
flowing to low- and moderate-income neighbourhoods. Otherwise, securitization could 




White (2004) suggests policy responses to predatory lending. If higher interest rates 
were adequately charged to cover higher credit risks, it could be inconvenient to police 
that practice because it would constrain lending to riskier borrowers. But his study finds 
that, besides covering credit and other risks, the charge of higher interest rates has a 
dishonest component and in this case it is adequate for authorities to pass legislation. 
The researcher proposes that dishonest pricing could be directly regulated. Even if 
subprime risks could be efficiently covered by higher interest rates, society as a whole 
and individual borrowers should be concerned with the practice of lending to very risky 
borrowers. “High-cost, high-risk lending results in both a substantial transfer of wealth 
from low-income borrowers to wealthy lenders and investors and in the serious 
consequences of default and foreclosure for individual families that are on the wrong 
end of the risk” (White, 2004, p. 27). So the efficient pricing of high-risk lending is not 
the only concern for regulators. They should also take into consideration social costs of 
efficiently priced loans to very risky borrowers that may fall victim of predatory lending. 
4.2 Discrimination of minorities and underprivileged classes 
Redlining is a practice in mortgage markets to not lend money to non-whites or in 
minorities neighbourhoods, and Bedford-Stuyvesant was no exception. Botein (2013) 
questions how the financial institutions passed from that kind of practice into predatory 
loans in that New York City black neighbourhood. The consequence of the growth of 
subprime lending in Bedford-Stuyvesant was the growth of foreclosures later on. The 
author uses both quantitative and qualitative methods including interviews with 
homeowners to understand their reasons on taking subprime loans, and how they were 
affected besides facing foreclosures. 
These people resorted to subprime lenders because they had a negative self-image of 
credit quality and thought that traditional lenders would redline that area. In practice, 




(2013) gets to the conclusion that usually people realized they were falling into a trap 
by accepting predatory conditions but they thought it was the best option for them 
because either traditional lenders had redlined their neighbourhood, or because brokers 
had established themselves in their communities’ social circles. 
Faber (2013) analyses race and segregation on the approval of loans and on the 
determination if loans should be prime or subprime. Particularly, the author studies how 
wealthy non-whites felt victim of predatory and subprime lending practices. He studies 
how much likely was a Black to be denied a loan compared with a white and, if approved, 
how much likely it would be a subprime than a prime loan. The author concludes that: 
Black home purchase mortgage applicants were 2.8 times more likely, Latinos 2.0 times 
more likely, and Asians 1.1 times more likely to be denied a loan than whites were […] If 
approved, blacks’ and Latinos’ applications were also 2.4 times more likely to result in a 
subprime loan than whites’ applications. 
In Faber (2013), p. 15. 
The objective of Immergluck & Smith (2005) is to find a good measure of the influence 
of subprime lending on neighbourhood foreclosure levels. The authors start the 
explanation of their results by exposing that between 1995 and 2002 foreclosure starts 
rose 238% on the geographic area studied. The authors find very relevant differences 
between different racial neighbourhoods. They registered an increase of 544% in 
foreclosure starts on communities where the population was 90% or more composed of 
racial or ethnical minorities. It was in minorities neighbourhoods that foreclosure starts 
were more felt, especially older minority neighbourhoods. They suggest that in 
neighbourhoods where the number of Blacks is growing “subprime lending explains 





Calem et al. (2004) objective is to estimate how can race, ethnics and neighbourhoods 
influence the probability of getting a subprime loan. They examine lending practices in 
seven major cities separately in 1997 and 2002 and then compare the results to study 
the evolution of the mortgage market. The authors “examine the relative likelihood that 
a conventional, refinancing loan is subprime in relation to a variety of neighbourhood 
demographic and economic variables [and] the interaction between neighbourhood and 
individual borrower demographic classifications” (Calem et al., 2004, p. 3). 
Calem et al. (2004) find that subprime lending is negatively related to the 
neighbourhood educational level, to the borrower income and to the median 
neighbourhood income. In contrast, subprime borrowing is positively related to 
neighbourhood credit risk and to the share of minorities’ people in communities, more 
significantly black populations. The results for other races are mixed. One surprising 
finding is that even if an applicant is white, the probability of getting a subprime loan 
increases if the house is in a black neighbourhood. While the authors state that their 
results cannot serve as a conclusion of the existence of racial discrimination in mortgage 
lending, they call for the need to pay attention to potentially discriminatory practices. 
According to Renuart (2004), high concentrations of subprime lending were found in 
minorities communities, and previous studies concluded that Blacks and Hispanics that 
could have applied to prime loans were many times steered to subprime loans. 
Predatory lenders usually target low- and moderate-income borrowers, women and 
older homeowners. Predatory lending practices include targeting people who are not 
even searching for loans, including older and minority homeowners. Transparency and 
true understanding of the mortgage terms by borrowers were rare. The settlement of 
the contract demanded 20 to 40 signatures by the borrowers and many had a low 
financial literacy. Closing terms often differed from what they were told they would get 




negative consequences and “wealth-building capacity of blacks and Hispanics may be 
permanently eliminated” (Renuart, 2004, p.20). 
Borrowers in the subprime market “are disproportionately minority and lower income, 
older, less well educated, less financially sophisticated, and less likely to search for the 
best interest rate when applying for a mortgage” (Lax et al., 2004, p. 2). These authors 
also find that subprime borrowers felt less in control of their finances and were 
uncomfortable dealing with banks, and experienced more life disruptions such as major 
medical expenses, unemployment and major decreases in income.  
4.3 Neighbourhood consequences of foreclosures 
Botein (2013) analyses the larger effects of foreclosures on the community of Bedford-
Stuyvesant. She also discusses ways to manage the problems faced by the community, 
namely how to get past the increasing number of people having difficulty paying their 
debts, and remarks that foreclosures are not the only negative consequence of subprime 
lending, but that people can be affected in other ways. 
Botein (2013) finds that the distress faced by people in this community goes much 
beyond foreclosures. This was because homeowners faced many financial accumulated 
risks and had to devise strategies to stay out of poverty. People even started trying to 
get loans from even more predatory lenders like “loan sharks, payday lending, and tax 
refund anticipation loans” (Botein, 2013, p. 20). The researcher makes an interesting 
discovery that most of the foreclosure filings applied to recent homeowners on that 
area. Those that had bought their houses decades before, despite also being targeted 
by subprime lenders to refinance on their home equity, were more resilient in avoiding 
foreclosures. The choice of the lender or mortgage broker often depended on opinions 
they got from persons on their social networks, what had a negative effect in the 




community she had made a good business on getting a loan from her, the member 
would spread the word and others would be impaired by the same predatory lender. 
Crump (2013) is an urban geographer that makes a qualitative analysis of the why’s and 
how’s of the foreclosures that stroke so many families throughout the USA and their 
consequences and meanings to communities. He centres his study on the metropolitan 
area of Minneapolis-St Paul, the so-called “twin cities”. He studies subprime and 
predatory, even fraudulent, lending practices. Then he examines mortgage transactions 
on a sample of houses that went into foreclosure and were located in a community 
where the majority of people were Afro-Americans. He bases his qualitative analyses on 
interviews made to people on that community and finishes his work by giving his opinion 
on the different consequences of the housing bust to lenders and borrowers. 
As mentioned by others, Crump (2013) also realizes that minorities were more affected 
by the housing crisis than whites were. The most noted consequences of the 
foreclosures were abandoned structures, health problems and relationships affected. 
All ended up having neighbourhood implications like “arson, and stripping of valuable 
copper and other metals” (Crump, 2013, p.9). The author finds that a stronger sense of 
personal responsibility emerged on the borrowers’ side, what can indicate that ethical 
and moral codes are not the same in the side of the financial institutions that locked in 
the profits during the boom times and then beneficiated from the bailouts while 
“millions of borrowers unjustly lose their homes and economic security as well as their 
physical and mental health” (Crump, 2013, p. 15). 
When defaults are highly concentrated, they can damage neighbourhoods (Quercia et 
al., 2007). This destabilization was most felt in neighbourhoods of minorities, of people 
with low-income and of elders that were the groups most targeted by predatory lenders. 




being hurt in their credit rating and reducing their capacity to get a rented house, new 
credit, insurance, or even a job. All this was complemented with psychological damages. 
Renuart (2004) finds that foreclosures have negative consequences not only to the 
families but also to their communities and cities who start losing from vacant and then 
vandalized houses that decline in value and consequently fewer property taxes are 
collected. 
4.4 Households’ cognitive limitations 
Nofsinger (2012) studies the behaviour of households during the boom and then bust 
times, and investigates how changes in social norms and culture might have led to the 
financial crisis and how this changes influenced household behaviour during and after 
the crisis. 
Due to psychological bias and rationality limitations, households’ behaviour during a 
boom tends to have a pro-cyclical effect and to have a positive influence on the 
emergence of speculative bubbles. It is easier to get into debt during boom times, so 
households use the leverage that will turn against them during bust times. When things 
go wrong they sell low their assets and become more interested in saving, amortizing 
their debts and consuming less, what will once again have a pro-cyclical influence in the 
economy. When we have good times, people will not pay attention to the pressure 
financial institutions exert on politicians and deregulation will gain momentum and 
aggravate speculative bubbles. But when bad times come, the public will then pressure 
the politicians for more regulation. But further regulation can impede the economy from 
recovering at the desired pace. 
There is the view that financial institutions and predatory lenders can benefit from 
consumers’ limited rationality and psychological bias, with product design and 




programs that specifically feed into these biases in order to take advantage of 
imperfectly rational clients” (Nofsinger, 2012, p. 6). They can do this because people 
have problems with dealing with too much information that is usually complex if we’re 
talking about loans and financial instruments. Also, the author considers that people 
usually suffer from optimism and short-term bias when estimating future costs. Another 
predatory strategy is finding those borrowers that are already facing difficulties and 
many lenders specialized on this. Those stressed borrowers would not use their full 
rationality in analysing the loan terms proposed by lenders. 
Bond et al. (2009) simulate a situation where there are one borrower and one lender. In 
this monopolistic analysis, they assume that the lender has an informational advantage 
over the borrower, and this asymmetry of information is the most important factor for 
the lender to propose a refinance in predatory conditions. The authors consider how 
that information asymmetry influences the subprime market. They demonstrate that 
information asymmetry is the core originator and can explain time and spatial 
distribution of predatory lending practices. They conclude that the increase in credit 
supplied due to information asymmetries reduces social welfare, and that competition 
between lenders is beneficial to borrowers because it reduces predatory lending.  
4.5 Securitization 
According to Aalbers (2009), the objective of financialization is to accumulate wealth 
through financial markets instead of production and trade. With financialization, loans 
are treated as financial assets. Securitization makes the link between the originators of 
loans and the investors in stock markets all around the World. Subprime and predatory 
lending were necessary to keep the machine of securitization running. This model, called 
“originate-to-distribute”, gained monstrous proportions. Financialization allied with 
globalization was the vehicle that turned a mortgage crisis in the USA into a worldwide 




houses’ equity. But this was a circle. It was the easy credit that allowed people to buy 
more homes, what consequently raised their prices allowing borrowers to take even 
greater loans. It was a self-feeding mechanism. Where did lenders get the money to 
finance the mortgage market? From securitization. If brokers and lenders could charge 
a higher interest rate, then they would promote a higher yield on the mortgage-backed 
assets they securitized and would receive more generous fees. To charge those higher 
rates they had to start lending to riskier borrowers and increase refinancing. 
Securitization can limit mortgage servicers’ abilities (an explanation of mortgage 
servicing will follow on subchapter 4.7) because of contradictions on their fiduciary 
duties to “investors holding different tranches of securitized pools” (Eggert, 2007, p. 2). 
Sometimes these conflicts don´t completely block loan modifications but delay the 
process. For example, there are many investors who invest in derivatives that will be 
profitable if the housing market collapses and foreclosures start to rise. Banks that sell 
those derivatives and assume the counterparty risk should be precluded from modifying 
loans to prevent them going into foreclosure with the goal of not having to assume 
losses in derivatives contracts. Since there are many diversified investor interests in 
securitization, loan modification becomes less effective. 
Renuart (2004) explains the characteristics of predatory loans from the initial phase of 
marketing to the closing phase of securitization and beyond. She ends up by explaining 
how the various actors get their profits on this process and their incentives. Lenders pay 
fees directly to brokers. Predatory lenders get exceptional profits from charging higher 
than competitive interest rates and fees and selling loans on the secondary market. 
Securitization is the fuel that keeps the subprime machine running and each of the 
participants in this process gets its share of the profits that are ultimately borne by 
borrowers. The investors provide the income that flows to lenders and allow them to 




investors and cover the costs of securitization. Money goes back and forth between 
lenders and investors and predatory lending sustains itself this way. In the end, wealth 
is transferred from middle- and lower-income families to predatory actors. 
Engel & McCoy test if predatory lending can be halted by secondary markets discipline. 
They explain how investors in MBS might suffer the consequences of predatory lending 
due to information asymmetries, chronicle the risks that securitization is exposed due 
to predatory lending, and how they can be managed. The researchers question if efforts 
to protect investors in MBS also avert abusive lending practices. Since the lenders collect 
their fees up front, securitization might be a way to secure their profits and pass the risk 
to investors, what may reduce the incentive for lenders to be rigorous when analysing 
the credit rating of applicants. Which risks do MBS investors face? They face credit risk 
which is inflated with predatory lending due to the lack of capacity of borrowers to pay 
their loans; prepayment risk that can be exacerbated by the practice of refinancing loans 
many times that is also predatory and damaging to borrowers; litigation risk because 
investors can be affected by lawsuits against the trusts that own the securitized loans. 
“The challenge for the secondary market over the past decades has been to structure 
securitization deals to reduce these risks to investors” (Engel & McCoy, 2004, p. 15). 
Securitization uses due diligence and credit enhancements to manage credit risk. 
Prepayment risk can be dealt with by applying heavy penalties to borrowers when they 
prepay but studies have shown that investors took exceptionally great profits in 
detriment of borrowers that were harmed. Litigation risk is managed by introducing 
terms to avoid investors liability on the loan originations. This risk proved to be quite 
small “because there are practical impediments to bringing predatory lending claims and 
also because securitization deals are intentionally structured to reduce such risk” (Engel 
& McCoy, 2004, p. 25). Those who usually invest in the senior tranches of MBS have little 




conclusion that none of the shields described in their article is good enough to reduce 
predatory practices because investors are protected by many mechanisms so they don’t 
feel enticed on pressing originators to stop predatory lending practices. In the end, 
borrowers are the only ones that are injured by predatory practices while investors, in 
fact, benefit from it. 
4.6 Steering prime borrowers into subprime loans 
On the mortgage market lenders have to specialize in a segment, prime or subprime. 
The results of Nichols et al. (2005) suggest that credit indicators influence the borrower 
being sold a prime, FHA (Federal Housing Administration) or subprime loan. Measures 
of credit risk such as credit history, “income, non-real estate debt, and value constraints” 
(Nichols et al., 2005, p. 20) play an important part in the choice of which category the 
loan will fall into. The researchers make sensitivity tests and find that no single 
characteristic would be determinant for a borrower to choose to apply to a subprime 
loan. She would only apply for this category of loans if there were more than one very 
negative indicators. 
White (2004) discusses if the high interest rates and fees charged on the subprime 
market are adequate to the level of subprime borrowers' risk or are excessive. Higher 
costs are supposedly charged to cover higher credit risk and other risks from lending in 
the subprime market. One of the conclusions White (2004) finds is that many subprime 
market borrowers had the credit quality to apply to prime loans. When pools of 
securitized loans were studied, many borrowers with prime credit rating were found in 
subprime pools of loans. The author finds that, while in the prime market the pricing is 
usually tabulated, in the subprime market there is a great dispersion of pricing that may 
be “based on information asymmetry, search costs, seller obfuscation, product 
differentiation, and principal-agent problems” (White, 2004, p. 19). Lax et al. (2004) also 




Lax et al. (2004) question if the subprime market is efficient in charging higher costs or 
predatory. To assess the efficiency of the subprime market, the researchers start by 
trying “to more systematically determine the role of risk in explaining why borrowers 
end up in the subprime market” (Lax et al., 2004, p. 25). Then they consider the 
differences of interest rates between the two mortgage markets to verify if they can be 
elucidated or not by differences in credit risk only. Lax et al. (2004) study validates that 
borrowers in the subprime market pay higher rates than those in the prime market 
mainly due to risk related causes, but other factors contribute to that difference such as 
demographic characteristics, knowledge, financial sophistication, being turned down by 
a lender and responding to an offer of guaranteed loan approval. Additional risks faced 
by subprime lenders don´t entirely explain the higher costs they charge. Though the 
above mentioned cannot be considered definitive, evidence indicates that the subprime 
market operates less efficiently than the prime market. This conclusion that some 
borrowers might have got subprime loans because of factors other than risk is alarming. 
4.7 De-regulation and other topics 
Garrison and Li (2011) find that people entered into cash-refinance loans to extract 
some equity of their homes that had appreciated in value for more than 20 years, getting 
the benefits from historically low interest rates. There were cases of people that had 
paid for vacations and luxury items with credit cards and were now trying to refinance 
with lower interest rates. So a housing bubble with constant appreciations in value 
allowed them to live above their possibilities. On the other side of the deal were lenders 
that were trying to make the greatest profit from these transactions and for that 
purpose counted on the complexity of the information that made it difficult for the 
borrowers to understand if the transactions were beneficial to them. 
Aalbers (2009) discusses the origins of the crisis. He considers that subprime and 




problem. He brings to the attention that prior causes encouraged subprime mortgages: 
“(1) deregulation and re-regulation, (2) financialization and globalization, and (3) 
bubbles and wrong incentives” (Aalbers, 2009, p. 2). Deregulation opened the doors to 
non-traditional lenders to enter the mortgage market. These non-traditional lenders 
were subject to weaker forms of regulation “and could therefore provide riskier loans 
without being monitored” (Aalbers, 2009, p. 3). Many times there were confusions 
between state-level and national level institutions about who should supervise what, 
and these institutions also failed to exercise their powers of supervision and regulation. 
In the USA there is a dual banking system where banks can apply to be supervised at the 
state or national level. This decision will influence not only which agencies will supervise 
a bank but also which practices are allowed, and regulations that it has to submit to. 
Nationally supervised banks don’t have to submit to regulations pre-empted by the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). Whalen (2008) studies if these pre-
emptions give national banks any kind of advantage over state-level supervised banks. 
Whalen appraises 
the wealth and risk effects attributable to a series of pre-emption announcements by the 
OCC. The expected effects of the announcements are inferred from changes in the return 
generating process for portfolios of target firms on event dates when the agency 
disclosed relevant new information about their pre-emption decisions to the market 
In Whalen (2008), p. 6. 
Whalen gets to the result that “wealth increased significantly only for small, 
geographically diversified national banks. Pre-emption did not significantly reduce state 
bank wealth and insignificant differences in excess returns are found when similar 




Rose (2008) considers that it is too simplistic to say that foreclosures derived from a 
specific or a combination of predatory lending practices. For example, one might think 
that low- or no-doc loans should be positively correlated with foreclosures, but only on 
refinances it was observed that this characteristic positively influenced foreclosures. If 
public authorities wanted to take this into account, they could pass legislation to require 
more documentation in refinancing loans. 
Mortgage collection is usually not accomplished by the originating lender but by a 
mortgage servicer that is hired by the trustee to assemble payments and manage the 
mitigation of losses in case the borrower defaults, for example by foreclosing. Eggert 
(2004) focuses on the servicing of residential mortgages namely how it affects borrowers 
“and what market and government forces are in place to prevent abusive behaviour by 
servicers” (Eggert, 2004, p.3). This article describes various opportunistic practices by 
mortgage servicers, discusses their causes, presents a case study of a servicer that 
adopted unscrupulous practices and examines how government and market actors can 
react to those practices. Servicer practices can be considered abusive when servicers 
obtain or try “to obtain unwarranted fees or other costs from borrowers, engage in 
unfair collection practices” (Eggert, 2004, p. 5) or make anything to cause the borrower 
to default or go into foreclosure. 
The author finds various abusive practices and that some borrowers went into 
foreclosure not because of their actions but due to the unscrupulous behaviour of 
mortgage servicers. The researcher presents the case study of Fairbanks Capital and 
provides conclusive evidence that some servicers, in fact, harmed borrowers with their 
abusive practices. Servicers have the capacity to engage in this unscrupulous behaviour 
because borrowers don’t have the opportunity to choose nor the capacity to control 
their services. “Legal sanctions against specific misbehaviour are provided by contract 




or by various public entities” (Eggert, 2004, p. 17). Even when laws are passed, 
borrowers have difficulty in enforcing those laws. For servicers to act ethically, other 
actors must intervene due to the lack of power of borrowers in this relationship. To limit 
opportunistic practices, states have passed legislation but for the author, he concludes, 
it doesn’t seem to be enough and more and new regulation is needed. 
Stegman et al. had written an article about the crescent importance of servicing and loss 
mitigation. Discussing that article, Eggert (2007) tries to identify the barriers to effective 
loss mitigation methods that could reduce foreclosures progression. The author starts 
by pointing out that preventive servicing can be of no help to borrowers who could not 
afford the loans in the first instance. Eggert writes this article in a time when subprime 
foreclosures had already started to rise and people were asking for more protection to 
borrowers including a reduction in subprime loans and stricter underwriting standards. 
Several barriers present to the work of servicing providers. Self-interest could reduce 
the celerity with which a servicer would modify a loan. This involves “abusive practices 
designed to increase their income to the detriment of borrowers” (Eggert, 2007, p. 10). 
Even if they don’t engage in abusive practices, servicers might slow down the process of 
borrowers becoming current because a portion of their income depends on late fees. 
Tax laws and accounting standards applying to securitized loans can also constitute 
barriers to loan modifications. 
Refinancing can even be harmful to borrowers. If they refinance, they still face the risk 
of failing the new payments established and going into foreclosure. This way, they would 
have only delayed foreclosure and stripped more equity on their houses besides losing 
defences they might have had in the initial loan. Sometimes lenders and servicers 
demand borrowers to waive claims against them when the loans are modified and 
therefore borrowers lose “the ability to obtain full relief from a predatory loan” (Eggert, 




standard for subprime servicing requires an understanding of which practices are most 
likely to cure defaults and which cures will last” (Eggert, 2007, p. 15). 
Mews & Abraham (2007) make a religiously based analysis on the difference between 
usury and interest (just compensation) and how usury can be compared to predatory 
lending. Usury is a word no longer used in finance and it is hard to include it in legislation. 
The charge of interest is considered normal and should depend on market forces. What 
we must worry about in modern finance ethics is with predatory lending, as opposed to 
just compensation, because the first involves practices by lenders who ultimately know 
that the borrowers won’t have the capacity, or will have great difficulties to pay their 
loans back. Mews & Abraham (2007) suggest that ethics is necessary for the relationship 
between lender and borrower and religious traditions can have a word to say on that 
relationship, as happened in Socially Responsible Investment by mutual funds. 
4.8 Analysis and Discussion of Results 
The sample is composed of 23 articles and 15 of them clearly consider that predatory 
lending was an important cause to the financial crisis of 2007-2009. The others don’t 
deny it but don’t give the same relevant importance. So, 65% of the articles I analyse 
confirm my initial hypothesis that, despite not being the most relevant cause, predatory 
lending clearly contributed to the crisis. 
Legislation was found to have positive effects on halting predatory lending practices on 
8 articles (35% of the sample). Discrimination of minority communities in lending 
practices is a theme approached in 7 articles (30%) that found evidence of that 
discrimination. Negative consequences of foreclosures on neighbourhoods, besides 
individual costs, were presented in 6 articles (26%). 
In 5 articles (22%) the authors explain that underprivileged classes are the most exposed 




limitations favoured predatory lending practices; in 3 articles it was found that 
borrowers that had conditions to apply for prime loans were thrown to subprime 
lending; and in 2 articles the researchers got to the conclusion that securitization played 
an extremely important role in fuelling predatory lending and, ultimately, in causing the 
financial crisis. 
Agarwal et al. (2014) conclude that predatory lending can contribute to high default 
rates, but it was not the sole contributor to the financial crisis and might not even have 
been an instrumental one, but only the first link in the origination of mortgages that 
would then be securitized by the following links of the chain. On the origins of 
foreclosures, people revealed to Crump (2013), were usually risky loans, health issues, 
unemployment and relationship problems such as divorce. Garrison & Li (2011) find that 
refinancing practices were usually predatory and abusive by the part of lenders, and the 
authors indicate that their methodology can be generalized to the general mortgage 
market besides the cases they simulated. Immergluck & Smith (2005) find an increase of 
foreclosure starts on prime loans, what is natural because the number of prime loans 
was increasing, but that effect was proportionally much stronger on subprime loans, and 
the difference assumed great proportions. For example, “in the case of home purchase 
loans, the subprime coefficient is more than 28 times as large as the prime coefficient” 
(Immergluck & Smith, 2005, p. 19). Rose (2008) concludes that the way predatory 
practices influence foreclosures is not straightforward and that he finds complex results 
in his analysis. “Subprime mortgage loans go into default and foreclosure at significantly 
higher rates than prime mortgage loans do” (Renuart, 2004, p.31). 
Quercia et al. (2007) get to the conclusion that “refinance loans with prepayment 
penalties are 20 percent more likely and those with balloon payments are 50 percent 
more likely to experience a foreclosure than other loans” (Quercia et al., 2007, p. 2). 




prepayment penalties than on loans without that characteristic. Comparing adjustable 
rate mortgages and balloon payments’ loans with fixed rate mortgages, the first two 
enter into foreclosure two months before on average than the latter. 
Lax et al. (2004) statistics confirm that subprime borrowers are riskier and exhibit higher 
payment-to-income ratios than prime borrowers. Subprime lenders dominate the likely 
riskier market of refinancing and are more inclined to issue riskier loans. 
Even after the closing of the loan, predatory practices continued such as offers to 
refinance the loan, placing monthly payments in incorrect accounts so that payments 
would not be timely charged and more fees and interest were collected, operating 
irrelevant property inspections and even fraudulently calculating interest (Renuart, 
2004). The result of these practices was equity stripping for many borrowers, eliminating 
the value of their houses and leading to foreclosures. On the other side, lenders and 
holders gained from equity stripping, and securitization in the secondary market inflated 
those gains. Many times, after long periods of struggle by families to pay their predatory 
loans, they ended up losing their homes in foreclosures. 
There was a theory that predatory lenders tried to impose subprime loan conditions on 
the upper middle class of non-white people, and Faber (2013) seems to confirm that. 
Though the conclusions appoint that way, Faber prefers to say that it is not clear that 
racial discrimination existed because other factors could also be contributing for that 
apparent discrimination. Mews & Abraham (2007) find that those from underprivileged 
classes are the most exposed to predatory lending practices. 
Some authors conclude that the costs of foreclosures affect not only individual 
borrowers or lenders but whole communities. Bond et al. (2009) conclude that social 





Some researchers, including Crump, arrive at the conclusion that there were different 
consequences between lenders and borrowers:  
Although lenders were provided bailouts, they have taken little, if any, responsibility for 
their actions leading to the housing crisis. In contrast […] homeowners are expected to 
satisfy mortgages that leave them in underwater homes with little or no hope of rescue. 
Borrowers are, therefore, made to bear the major cost of the U.S. housing crisis 
In Crump (2013), p. 3. 
Some authors get to the conclusion that households’ behaviour plays an important part 
in an economic crisis. 
At the beginning of this century, the American dream was the dream of homeownership. 
The White House Administration and policymakers contributed for this by encouraging 
government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to provide financing 
and securitization for the home mortgage market, and emphasized “on expanding 
homeownership in the United States, particularly among people and communities of 
colour” (Botein, 2013, p. 4), what facilitated predatory lending practices that were more 
felt on previously redlined minority communities. After a few years, widespread over-
indebtedness created an abundance of defaults that reduced banks’ capital, in a 
downward spiral that eventually became the biggest economic disaster in the lifetime 
of the large majority of living people. 
Allied to predatory lending, other causes contributed for that financial disaster: 
defective corporate governance and risk management practices at financial institutions, 
including inadequate stress-testing of portfolios; housing bubble and lack of common 
sense in mortgages’ market, the burst of which created enormous losses for 
homeowners and investors; loose monetary policy with low interest rates making it 




to those willing to take large risks in the stock market and the bubbling housing market, 
especially in high-risk mortgages; financial advisers encouraged customers to buy and 
sell securities in ways that did not contribute to the improvement of their financial 
situation; outdated regulatory framework applicable to the financial services industry, 
with regulatory lapses, and the regulators that had ample authority to constrain financial 
institutions from taking excessive risks did not do so; irrational compensation practices 
not linked to long-term profitability, and conflicts of interest caused by compensation 
structures that had an important portion of exotic and toxic financial instruments; credit 
rating agencies’ failure to investigate the soundness of the securities they were rating. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The main contribution of this work is to synthesise the view of various academic and 
non-academic researchers on the comprehension of predatory lending and how 
practices related to it contributed to the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Since I analyse a 
sample of relevant articles written since 2004, this work can open the way for deeper 
investigation about this theme but also for a larger examination of other causes that 
also contributed to the crisis. 
Though this work is not very ambitious in scope, due to space restrictions, the subject 
of predatory lending deserves the reflection of finance practitioners that can get 
conclusions from the results I analyse and discuss. 
Effectively, predatory lending was one of the ethical failures on the offspring of the 
financial crisis. It was a practice that came from previous decades but had the most 
catastrophic consequences on the first decade of this century because of the number of 
foreclosures it caused and the consequent negative consequences on individual 




Financial institutions should have a moral and ethical obligation to not engage on this 
kind of practices, and to respect the positions not only of their shareholders, whose 
interests are often forgotten in detriment of the short-term objectives of executives, but 
also of stakeholders and society as a whole. Corporate social responsibility has grown in 
importance in the last decades, and financial institutions should also feel obligated by it 
when making their decisions. 
Financial institutions are already under the guidance of many laws, that restrict what 
they can do. Those laws are fundamental to their actions, but ethical principles should 
not be disregarded and should get priority above short-termism that is so many times 
characteristic of executives. To make socially responsible decisions something has to 
change so that we don’t fall in a cycle of economic depressions caused by the excesses 
of prior bubbles. How to apply ethics on specific actions is a challenge to everyone, 
including to those who dedicate themselves to the study of Finance. CFA Institute is one 
of the organizations that contributes to elevating the issue of Ethics with its’ affiliates 
and has a Code of Ethics and Standards of Professional Conduct. 
That is why it can be important to incorporate Ethics in the management of 
corporations. The objective is to avoid the same mistakes of the past and the repetition 
of a crisis with the dimension of that occurred on 2007-2009. For society to keep trust 
in its rulers and in those who can influence most the markets, it is important to make 
the analysis of the causes of the latest great recession. Understanding those causes may 
enact governments to more rapidly and efficiently react in a similar situation in the best 
interest of their citizens and taxpayers. 
Ethics can act as a STOP sign when certain risks are being faced, so I conclude that it is 
really necessary in our times and for the future. So it is positive that an institution like 
ISEG also gives lectures on this subject on the Master’s in Finance classes. If lawmakers 




most important is to put Ethics into practice in current management decisions, so that 
better long-term results can be attained, instead of having a short-term perspective. 
The key financial market function of accounting and auditing firms, securities firms, 
commercial and investment banks, supervisors, law firms, rating agencies and stock 
exchanges is to vouch for the integrity and quality of information, transactions, 
procedures and financial instruments on the basis of their reputation (Blommestein, 
2006). This reputation has been seriously damaged by the investigations under which 
these institutions are, over and over again, being scrutinized. Repeated assaults on the 
integrity of markets have damaged trust in finance. 
On the years preceding the 2007-2009 financial crisis, bankers were blinkered and acted 
so opportunistically to a self-destructive extent that brought on a financial crisis, 
influenced by a culture of arrogance, greed, excessive risk-taking and a lack of 
leadership. A downward shift in ethical standards, creative and questionable accounting 
with auditors’ complicity, and bankers’ social irresponsibility and even fraudulent 
behaviour in some cases, coupled with lightheaded, sometimes delirious, risk 
management practices facilitated by securitizations, derivatives and other complex 
financial transactions that generated phantom earnings or removed unwanted debts 
from balance sheets, ended up in a major crisis. 
There was a rise in the share of mortgages with low or no documentation and a surge in 
early payment defaults. Because down payments were so small, when house prices 
declined, many borrowers had little or no equity in their properties and thus less 
incentive to repay their mortgages. 
Government housing policies contributed to the development of a massive housing 
bubble and the financial crisis of 2008. The monetary policy of the Federal Reserve 




realized far too late the systemic risks, i.e., risks that pose a threat to the financial 
system. 
The collapse of the housing bubble began the chain of events that led to the financial 
crisis. Defaults and losses on the insured mortgages increased. Investors filed lawsuits, 
and court actions involved almost all major loan originators and underwriters. 
The first of the biggest investment banks to fail was Bear Stearns. Later, Lehman 
Brothers’ bankruptcy filing, with no government rescue, added to uncertainty and panic 
in the financial markets. Then policymakers feared contagion so they were unwilling to 
allow big financial companies to go bankrupt. A few days later, the Federal Reserve, with 
support from Treasury, rescued AIG. 
But if we look back in history, we behold a circular phenomenon, returning repeatedly. 
Stock-market downturns bring to the surface unethical transgressions committed during 
the euphoria of the preceding booms, and booms are always followed by busts. Enron 
and Lehman Brothers were not just accidents, but probably scapegoats for the whole 
system that kept running the same as before. A philosopher supposedly said that those 
who do not remember the past are condemned to repeat it. I conclude that studying the 
2008 credit crisis history is essential to avoid its repetition. 
Only adherence to higher moral standards could have prevented many of the 21st-
century corporate scandals. Some alternative behaviours do exist, with positive role 
models such as socially responsible investment, the Co-operative Bank in the United 
Kingdom or the Triodos Bank from the Netherlands. 
The pressures on people in finance today are immense, and the difficulty of succeeding, 
combined with the high rewards that are still possible, create great temptations for 
unethical, as well as illegal, behaviour. Just as necessary as good regulation, ethics in 




responsibility. High ethical standards provide the necessary link between rules and 
business behaviour. Only in this way can we be assured that high corporate governance 
standards are adhered to, and that trust in finance is restored. 
 
6. Limitations and perspectives of 
future research 
This work consists of a meta-analysis that tries to determine the relevance of predatory 
lending as one of the ethical failures on the offspring of the 2007-2009 financial crisis. 
This methodology is suitable to present a resume of perspectives by academic and non-
academic researchers on this subject. 
However, this methodology has its limitations, since I only used one database for my 
search (Scopus), what might reduce the sources of study since the articles could have 
been different if I had opted for another database. I limited my search to the keyword 
“predatory lending” and didn’t deepen my analysis of other causes of the financial crisis. 
The articles chosen focused mostly on the USA mortgage market, so it remains to be 
done an analysis about predatory lending and other causes to the crisis that also 
affected European and Worldwide markets, and possible different consequences due to 
social, economic or cultural factors. 
Other meta-analyses can be made on other causes of the financial crisis and the 
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1 "results suggest that predatory lending practices contributed to high mortgage default rates among subprime borrowers, raising them by about a third" (Agarwal et al., 2014)
2 "Subprime lending flourished in a neighborhood that historically was redlined by conventional lenders, and created and exacerbated poverty, as it stripped equity from individuals and the neighborhood." (Botein, 2013)
3 "Subprime mortgage lending in the early 2000s was a leading cause of the Great Recession" (Faber, 2013)
4 "people wound up in foreclosure […] human costs of the U.S. housing crisis" (Crump, 2013)
5 "In the recent boom, predatory lenders preyed on cognitive limitations and biases of subprime borrowers to sell them high cost mortgages that they would not be able to repay" (Nofsinger, 2012)
6 "suggest that a formal cost-benefit analysis for cash-out refinances should be considered as part of the larger mortgage reform currently underway" (Garrison & Li, 2011)
7 "When controlling for loan and local conditions, we observe […] lower default levels in states with higher temporal and financial costs to lenders" (Goodman & Smith, 2010)
8 "predatory lending is associated with highly collateralized loans, inefficient refinancing of subprime loans, lending without due regard to ability to pay […] and poorly informed borrowers" (Bond et al., 2009)
9 "Subprime loans have been one important ingredient in the present crisis, but other ingredients go beyond subprime lending" (Aalbers, 2009)
10 "The evidence suggests that preemption did not create a significant competitive advantage for national banks endangering the dual banking system" (Whalen, 2008)
11 "Results suggest that the relationship between these loan features and foreclosure rates is much more complicated than the arguments for restricting their use assume" (Rose, 2008)
12 Religious traditions can have a positive influence on financial ethics
13 "suggest that policy makers can address predatory lending in the subprime residential mortgage market without restricting access to credit" (Li & Ernst, 2007)
14 "barriers to effective loan modifications should be reduced or eliminated where feasible, but that the securitization of subprime loans creates risks for borrowers" (Eggert, 2007)
15 "estimate that prepayment penalties and balloon payment requirements in 1999 refinance originations increased national foreclosure-related losses to lenders and investors" (Quercia et al., 2007)
16 "provides evidence that borrowers are being effectively sorted based on risk characteristics by the market" (Nichols et al., 2005)
17 "subprime loans lead to foreclosures at far greater rates than do prime loans. Moreover, subprime lending appears to account for a substantial share of foreclosure" (Immergluck & Smith, 2005)
18 "find some evidence of tightening loan standards in the subprime market over this five-year period" (Calem et al., 2004)
19 "While the secondary market does impose some discipline on the subprime home loan market, it is not enough to bring predatory lending to a halt" (Engel & McCoy, 2004)
20 "summarizes observations about the goals of predatory lenders and notes that by accomplishing these goals, lenders undermine the wealthbuilding capacity of affected homeowners" (Renuart, 2004)
21 "Information asymmetries, seller obfuscation, and search costs contribute to the inefficiencies in [the subprime market] and suggest several policy responses" (White, 2004)
22 "concerns over the relative efficiency of the subprime market may be warranted" (Lax et al., 2004)





Brief description of statistical models and variables used by the authors that made 
quantitative studies (complementary to the presented results) 
Agarwal et al. use a “classic difference-in-differences analysis that contrasts changes in 
mortgage market composition and loan performance in the treated sample with those in a 
control sample” (Agarwal et al., 2014, p.2). They compare mortgages between samples to 
examine differences in risky characteristics such as “negative amortization or prepayment 
penalties […] low documentation and low down-payment […] above-market rates, loans 
appearing to be unaffordable based on borrower characteristics, and loans with indications of 
fraud” (Agarwal et al., 2014, p.2) and their consequences in loan performance. 
Botein (2013) uses both quantitative and qualitative methods, namely she uses public data 
about real estate transactions, but also interviews the homeowners personally to understand 
their reasons on taking subprime loans, and how they were affected besides facing foreclosures. 
She studies a total of 222 properties and uses property records from the New York City’s 
Department of Finance from 1966 through 2010, “sales data from 2003 to 2010 and foreclosure 
filings from 2000 through 2010, purchased from two private vendors” (Botein, 2013, p. 8), and 
obtains estimations for property values. 
Faber (2013) uses a data set from Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) that includes 
borrower characteristics, information about the house, application and Census region 
characteristics. He uses multinomial regression models to analyse mortgage approval processes 
from 2006, and includes an analysis of race and segregation on the approval of loans and on the 
determination if loans should be prime or subprime. 
Crump (2013) uses 2004-2008 HMDA data and examines mortgage transactions on a sample of 
houses that had went into foreclosure and were located in a community where the majority of 
people were Afro-Americans. In his analysis he includes variables as “whether a loan was 
considered high cost […] borrower-level information such as race and ethnicity, loan amount, 
type of loan, and gender” (Crump, 2013, p. 5). 
Garrison and Li (2011) use NMDR – National Mortgage Data Repository – information that 
contains relevant documentation not usually accessible to researchers, such as the application 




propose “reasonable assumptions to project the future cash flows under the cash-out refinance 
and under the alternative decision not to refinance […] we then measure its rate of return by 
two standard financial decision tools: internal rate of return (IRR) and net present value (NPV). 
We compare these two tools to identify the appropriate measurement of ‘‘net tangible 
benefits.’’ Then using a set of constructed variables for hypothetical cash-out refinance 
transactions, we ask under what conditions are the cash-out financially favourable or costly to 
the borrower. Finally, we examine the ‘‘net tangible benefit’’ for real cash-out refinances 
contained in the NMDR database as case studies” (Garrison & Li, 2011, p. 6). 
Goodman and Smith (2010) utilize a sample from a 34 million loan database for all the United 
States with data from the third quarter of 2008 aggregated at the zip code level, and use state 
variations in foreclosures, “static and dynamic demographic information to control for economic 
variations and location fixed effects […] to determine the political and locational drivers of 
default” (Goodman & Smith, 2010, p. 2). The authors make a spatial analysis of the locations 
where defaults and foreclosures occurred. 
Bond et al. (2009) simulate situations where there is one borrower and one (to analyse 
monopolistic lending) or more lenders (to analyse the effects of competition on predatory 
practices). In the monopolistic analysis they assume that the lender has an informational 
advantage over the borrower. 
Whalen (2008) uses HMDA data to determine in which states each bank is present and to how 
many regulations will it have to comply, using this as an indicator of cost to the bank. He uses a 
multivariate regression model “to estimate the wealth and risk effects attributable to a series of 
preemption announcements by the OCC. The expected effects of the announcements are 
inferred from changes in the return generating process for portfolios of target firms on event 
dates when the agency disclosed relevant new information about their preemption decisions to 
the market” (Whalen, 2008, p. 6). The author starts by choosing the relevant dates when OCC 
makes announcements related to preemptions. Then he chooses a sample of banks which may 
be affected by those announcements, and groups them according to state or national level, and 
to size and number of states they’re operating in. That sample is taken from a list of banks whose 
stocks were quoted on Bloomberg from October 2002 to April 2004. He ends up by estimating 
the returns to those banks from this process and tests if “preemption had significantly different 




Rose (2008) uses more than 200,000 quarterly observations covering 31,353 loans that 
originated between the beginning of 1999 and mid-2003 in the Chicago metropolitan area. 
There’s one observation for each quarter a loan stands active. If the loan is prepaid or goes into 
foreclosure, then he doesn’t search for more observations after that. To do the econometric 
analysis, the author used a multinomial logit model. Starting with explanatory variables, he 
estimates their impact on the probability of foreclosure. The data Rose uses has very complete 
information, including if the loan is a refinance or a repurchase, if it is FRM (fixed rate mortgage) 
or ARM (adjustable rate mortgage), if there are prepayments or foreclosures and the dates those 
events occurred, if the loan was originated with low- or no-documentation, if there was a 
prepayment penalty period and its length, and if it included balloon payments. 
Li and Ernst (2007) use data from almost 7 million loans from the Loan Performance (LP) 
Subprime Asset- Backed Securities Database. They take observations from 1998 through the first 
quarter of 2005 that span all the states and the District of Columbia (DC). The database they use 
has many relevant information on loans, namely origination date, FICO score, state, LTV ratio, 
zip code and prepayment penalty. 
Quercia et al. (2007) use data about securitized subprime refinance first-lien loans gathered 
from LP Subprime Asset-Based Securities Database. They examine more than 122,000 refinance 
loans originated in 1999 that totalled almost 34 billion dollars, and record their payments 
through December 2003. They make their tests using a multinomial logit model to “estimate the 
impact that prepayment penalties and balloon loans have on monetary losses due to foreclosure 
for the lenders and investors who own the loans” (Quercia et al., 2007, p.17). 
Nichols et al. (2005) use data from purchases made by more than 48 thousand households in 39 
metropolitan areas that resulted in the origination of FRMs from February 1996 to July 1996. 
They make both a theoretical and empirical evaluation of the differences between the personal 
lending and the mortgage markets. 
Immergluck & Smith (2005) make a multivariate quantitative estimation of the influence that 
subprime lending had on foreclosure levels, and also focus their analysis on neighbourhood 
effects. They acquired data for foreclosure starts from 1995 to 2002 on the Chicago metropolitan 





Calem et al. (2004) use data from four sources to get a list of subprime lenders, to get borrower’ 
and mortgage characteristics for the two years studied, to build measures of neighbourhood 
credit risk separated by regions, and about the distribution of individual credit ratings on those 
regions. The authors estimate two models and in the second one include interaction terms to 
find any relationship between subprime lending and the racial composition of communities. 
Lax et al. (2004) gather data from various sources, the main one a telephone survey to a 
population of borrowers who originated their loans from January 1996 to June 1997 and filtered 
4,342 completed surveys. From QuickData they gather data about amount, purpose and type of 
loans. They separate purchases, refinances and second-liens. They compile credit history 
information about the telephone survey respondents from a credit repository, use information 
from Freddie Mac on pools of loans recently acquired, extract data from HMDA from 1996 and 
1997, and meet with focus groups of lenders and borrowers to gather qualitative information. 
They “estimate two logistic regression models […] the risk-only model includes only risk 
measures—LTV ratio/FICO score, income ratio/payment ratio, product type, and loan purpose—
as explanatory variables […] the expanded model adds borrower demographics and responses 
to key questions from the Gallup survey […] comparing the two models allows us to assess the 
impact that factors other than the typical risk factors used by underwriters (e.g., demographics, 
knowledge, and education) have on predicting the choice of market segment” (Lax et al., 2004, 
p. 26). 
